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VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF
ENTERTAINMENT & TECHNOLOGY LAW
VOLUME 16 FALL 2013 NUMBER 1
From Berne to Beijing: A Critical
Perspective
Remarks by Professor David Lange*
ABSTRACT
Remarking on the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances
at the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law's
Symposium, From Berne to Beijing, Professor Lange expressed general
misgivings about exercising the Treaty Power in ways that alter the
nature of US copyright law and impinge on other constitutional rights.
This edited version of those Remarks explains Professor Lange's
preference for legislation grounded squarely in the traditional
jurisprudence of the Copyright Clause, the First Amendment, and the
public domain, and his preference for contracting around established
expectations rather than reworking default rules through treaties. It
continues by exploring the particular costs associated with the Beijing
Treaty's expansion of moral rights into US copyright law. Those
expanded rights, viewed in light of previous legislative and judicial
expansions of traditional US copyright principles, threaten to erode
certain portions of the public domain and the exercise of First
Amendment rights. Recognizing that additional rights for some result
in a loss of rights for others, these Remarks invite critical reflection on
the costs and benefits of the Beijing Treaty, "copyright restoration," and
other well-intentioned alterations to the status quo.
I thank the editors of the Journal for their kind invitation to
speak today.
David Lange is the Melvin G. Shimm Professor of Law at the Duke Law School. His
remarks have been prepared at the kind invitation of the Editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of
Entertainment & Technology Law, on the occasion of the Journal's Conference, From Berne to
Beijing, held at the Vanderbilt Law School, Friday, January 25, 2013. Professor Lange spoke as a
member of the Conference's Panel on the Film Industry.
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And I congratulate Justin Hughes, SAG/AFTRA, and the MPAA
on their success in Beijing, and especially on the signing of the Beijing
Treaty last summer.1 I am sympathetic to the struggles faced by actors
and performers everywhere, and nowhere more so than in the
audiovisual arts.
In truth, though, I do have some misgivings about treaties of this
sort-that is to say, treaties that alter the nature of US copyright law
generally, but more especially those that elevate the importance of
moral rights by giving them a more prominent place in US law than
they have customarily had.2
I can say why in a few sentences: I generally prefer contracts to
laws of universal application. 3 I think moral rights that presume to
limit new authors' expression by restricting otherwise permissible use
of works under copyright or in the public domain-for example under
doctrines of fair use or parody-are troublesome in a constitutional
setting like ours. When it comes to protecting rights in creative
expression, I prefer legislation still grounded squarely in the traditional
jurisprudence of the Copyright Clause, the First Amendment, and the
public domain, as against a more substantial de facto role for the Treaty
Power and the Commerce Clause.4 I think the US experience with
multilateral treaties since Berne has made it clear that we may sacrifice
some of what is exceptional and valuable in our own culture in order to
harmonize our laws with others in the pursuit of global commerce. 5 And
I resist casting aside settled expectations in any industry for the sake
of change, however appealing that change may seem to be. I am not
adamant as to any of these points, save for the question of creative
expression. I merely share with Edmund Burke an inclination to think
that change very often does not prove to be quite as appealing when the
smoke clears and the costs are counted.
Whether these reservations may prove to be warranted in the
case of the Beijing Treaty remains to be seen. Of course there are bound
1. Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, World Intellectual Property
Organization, June 24, 2012, AVP/DC/20 [hereinafter Beijing Treaty], available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file-id=295837.
2. See, e.g., id. art. 5 (granting performers rights of attribution and integrity, even
following a transfer in copyright ownership, among other things).
3. See, e.g., Matthew Rushton, Global Justice at a Crossroads, 63 INT'L B. NEWS 14
(2009) ("The very notion of universal application of laws ... is 'fascinating to everyone, a pipedream
to many, an aspiration to many and a nightmare for others."' (quoting Professor David Crane,
former chief prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone)).
4. See generally DAVID LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAW: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009).
5. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 893 (2012); see also David L. Lange, Risa J.
Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed, Golan v. Holder: Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment,
11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 83 (2011).
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to be questions: Is the definition of a "performer" sensible in a medium
in which any day now someone is sure to film World War II with the
original cast?6 Should the term of protection really reach back fifty
years? 7 Will it eventually reach back further?8 And so on. But for the
moment-again with one exception-the treaty seems benign enough
on its face.
That exception is in its concern for moral rights which, as I say,
may survive or stand apart from copyright in ways that can impede
other authors' use of an actor's work. It is most troubling once the work
is (or otherwise would be) in the public domain.9 As in the case of Article
6bis of the Berne Convention, concerns of this sort are
understandable. 10 But at least in my own opinion they are potentially
at odds, in a conceptual sense, with the Copyright Clause's "limited
times" provision, with the even more important (and antecedent) claims
the public domain should bring to bear on every work of expression,
and, most importantly-in a constitutional sense-with the First
Amendment.11
And here, I suppose, is just where the thrust of my own remarks
necessarily begins. For nearly everything I have just presupposed by
implication about the Copyright Clause, the First Amendment, and the
public domain has been set at sixes and sevens, perhaps beginning with
the Uruguay Round of the GATT in 1986,12 but surely with our
adherence to the Berne Convention in 1989,13 and culminating in two
cases decided within the past decade-each of them a muddled
reflection of our effort to secure a wider place among the copyright
nations of the world. 14
Our experience has been that sometimes a multilateral treaty
can carry us too far. That can happen because the treaty itself (or some
part of it) is a bad idea, or at least inconsistent with the traditions of
our culture. It might also happen because the idea is badly
6. Beijing Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2.
7. Id. art. 14; see generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
8. See generally Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873.
9. See generally Lange et al., supra note 5.
10. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis,
September 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908,
completed at Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26,
1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on Sept. 28,
1979, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/enip/berne/trtdocswoOOl.html.
11. See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 4, at ix.
12. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
13. Berne Convention, supra note 10.
14. See generally Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 194 (2003).
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implemented in the course of enabling legislation. And when something
like that presents itself, precedents can follow that are
ill-judged and even destructive.
15
Two pieces of legislation prompted by our adherence to treaties
illustrate the first problem, which arises particularly when the Treaty
Power and the Commerce Clause take center stage, casting a shadow
over the Copyright Clause. 16 One is the so-called Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1998 (SBCTEA), which added twenty years to
the terms of copyrighted works in the United States.17 The other is the
so-called Copyright Restoration Act (the "URAA"), which conferred US
copyright protection upon millions of foreign works that had fallen into
the public domain in this country-sometimes for reasons grounded in
a failure to comply with no-longer-applicable formal prerequisites to US
copyright, and sometimes because the proprietors of the foreign works
simply did not seek or even want US protection.18 The Supreme Court
upheld both Acts against objections grounded in the Copyright Clause,
the First Amendment, and the public domain. 19
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, Justice Ginsburg, writing for a majority,
approved the SBCTEA.20 From the majority's analysis, the Copyright
Clause offers few constraints against Congressional discretion as to
term limits. 21 As for the First Amendment, copyright contains its own
doctrinal safeguards against encroachments upon freedom of
expression; as long as copyright's "traditional contours" (in her usage of
the phrase, the idea-expression dichotomy, and fair use) remain in
place, heightened First Amendment scrutiny is not required.
22
Meanwhile, last year's decision in Golan v. Holder upheld the
URAA. 23 The loss to the public domain seemed harsher and more stark
in Golan than it had in Eldred. The URAA meant (among other things)
that some persons, who had relied on the public domain status of earlier
15. See generally Lange et al., supra note 5.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8,
cl. 8.
17. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 3287 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
301 (2012)).
18. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
19. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192-94.
20. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194.
21. See id. at 218 ("For the several reasons stated, we find no Copyright Clause
impediment to the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights."); see also id. at 223 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
22. Id. at 221 ('But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional
contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary." (citing Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987))).
23. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 875, 894. In Justice Ginsburg's usage of the phrase, such
"traditional contours" consist of the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use. Id. at 890.
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works in creating derivative works of their own, now faced either the
unexpected payment of royalties for their continuing use of the restored
works, or else the forfeiture of their right to exploit the derivative works
they had created.
2 4
In Golan, once again, Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the
majority.25 In some part, as she herself insisted, her opinion in Golan
merely reiterated what she had written in Eldred.26 "Concerning the
First Amendment," she wrote, "we recognized [in Eldred] that some
restriction on expression is the inherent and intended effect of every
grant of copyright."27 Assuming copyright's traditional safeguards, and
assuming content neutrality (as the parties in Golan, like the parties in
Eldred, had conceded), the prospect of a particular role for the First
Amendment is effectively precluded.
28
Likewise, her opinion in Golan echoes what she had said in
Eldred about the Copyright Clause. Justice Ginsburg's opinion reads
that Clause to confer what is now essentially unreviewable discretion
upon Congress to deal with copyright as it thinks best.29 Absent some
"misbehavior" (her word, not mine), the Clause has no significant role
to play in reviewing that discretion.
30
In one respect, however, her opinion in Golan goes much further
than anything she had seemed to say in Eldred. For most copyright
practitioners and scholars, the public domain has been thought to be
essentially inviolate. 31 Indeed, in Eldred it appeared that members of
the Court who addressed the subject at all during oral argument also
assumed that Congress was not free to withdraw works from the public
domain, and that it was important in a constitutional sense that the
SBCTEA did not propose to do so.
32
24. See id. at 878 ("Petitioners include orchestra conductors, musicians, publishers, and
others who formerly enjoyed free access to works § 514 removed from the public domain.").
25. Id. at 877.
26. See generally Eldred, 537 U.S. 186.
27. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889.
28. Lange et al., supra note 5, at 122.
29. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 ("[W]e explained, the Clause
'empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body's
judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause."' (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222)).
30. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 873 ("But as in Eldred, such hypothetical misbehavior is far
afield from this case."); Lange et al., supra note 5.
31. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Is the Copyright Public Domain Irrevocable? An Introduction to
Golan v. Holder, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANc 123, 124 (2011) ('Traditionally, the copyright public
domain has been considered irrevocable.").
32. See Transcript of Oral Argument at * 17, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No.
01-618), available at http://www.aaronsw.com/2002/eldredTranscript ("it does take a lot of things
out of the public domain that one would think that someone in Congress would want to think hard
about"); Lange et al., supra note 5, at 98.
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But Golan makes it appear that these assumptions have been
unwarranted. In a narrow sense, to be sure, Ginsburg's opinion merely
upheld the URAA, where at least the works are of foreign origin and
have never enjoyed a full term of copyright protection in the United
States.33 All such works are now free to enjoy the protection they would
have secured if they had behaved from the beginning as US copyright
proprietors were obliged to do in order to secure protection.34
From another perspective, however, the URAA confers benefits
upon millions of works whose US counterparts remain, at least for the
time being, in the public domain. 35 In this sense, the URAA privileges
foreign works above works with US origins. But if that is so, how long
can we expect that distinction to hold effect? Could Congress withdraw
US works from the public domain on grounds identical to those in the
URAA--or for other reasons now within the reach of Congressional
discretion? Could Congress even imaginably withdraw works that have
enjoyed a full term of protection?
To the surprise of many who have read Ginsburg's opinion in
Golan, even the last extreme proposition does not seem entirely
far-fetched now. Though she does not quite say so in explicit terms, she
is at pains not to preclude the idea altogether. 36 Withdrawals obviously
calculated to avoid the limited times provision of the Copyright Clause
might conceivably amount to impermissible "misbehavior" (again, her
word, not mine); but, something less than that would not necessarily
cross any forbidden lines at all.3 7 It would not matter that the effect of
such withdrawals might not serve as an incentive to the creation of new
works; Justice Ginsburg's opinion elevates distribution and other
exploitation of works to a status on par with the creation of new works
as worthy goals for Congress to pursue through the Copyright Clause. 38
Ultimately, the question of wholesale restoration would raise questions
for Congress to resolve. But the Clause presumably would not forbid
33. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878; 17 U.S.C. § 514 (2012).
34. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 ('Works encompassed by § 514 are granted the protection
they would have enjoyed had the United States maintained copyright relations with the author's
country or removed formalities incompatible with Berne.").
35. Id. ("As a consequence of the barriers to U.S. copyright protection prior to the
enactment of § 514, foreign works "restored" to protection by the measure had entered the public
domain in this country.").
36. See generally Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873.
37. Id. at 875 ("But as in Eldred, such hypothetical misbehavior is far afield from this
case.").
38. Id. at 876 ('The creation of new works, however, is not the sole way Congress may
promote 'Science,' i.e., knowledge and learning.").
[Vol. 16:1:1
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it. 39 The First Amendment would remain irrelevant. 40 The public
domain itself may simply be without "constitutional significance. '41
The effect of these two cases, but particularly Golan, is to
recognize the broadest Congressional latitude with respect to copyright
legislation ever conceded by the Court. The breadth of that concession
is remarkable in an absolute sense, and nothing less than stunning to
those who have supposed (it now appears erroneously) that the
Constitution must have some role to play in constraining Congress in
this field.
I would respond now by saying that the Constitution does
remain relevant, but not in the sense that we might have expected.
Thanks to the siren call of global commerce and multilateral treaties,
the constitutional emphasis has shifted. We may go on saying that we
care about creative expression, and in some newly constricted sense, no
doubt we do. But thanks to Justice Ginsburg we are obliged to care
considerably more about the politics of global commerce under the more
distant auspices of the Treaty Power 42 and the Commerce Clause.43
Every effort in the direction of multilateral harmony results in
at least some adjustment in the marginal costs of creative expression.
That is not necessarily bad. But neither is it necessarily a win-win
situation. Add twenty years to the term of copyright and someone
downstream pays or loses. Restore copyright in millions of foreign
works, and again someone pays or loses. Add performance rights in the
recording or film and television industries, retroactive across some fifty
years, and yet again someone must ante up what someone else will now
pocket. But these consequences, and others like them, are relatively
manageable concerns, even in my own assessment. A treaty merely
picks up where a contract leaves off (or is muscled aside). The smaller
economic effects may remain debatable at some abstract level. It seems
unnecessary to worry about the Beijing Treaty in these terms just now,
however, especially if the film industry itself approves.
What I do care about myself is freedom of expression. And there
really is no question that in consequence of each of the first two
39. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 ("[W]e explained, the Clause
'empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body's
judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause."' (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222
(2003))).
40. See generally Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889-94.
41. Id. at 888 n.26 ('The dissent also suggests, more tentatively, that at least where
copyright legislation extends protection to works previously in the public domain, Congress must
counterbalance that restriction with new incentives to create. Even assuming the public domain
were a category of constitutional significance, we would not understand 'the Progress of Science'
to have this contingent meaning." (citations omitted)).
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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real-life scenarios I have just described there will be some expression
that simply will never see the light of day. Some author's estate will
hold on to the rights in their decedent's work for sentimental reasons
entirely understandable in themselves, but with the result that the
works will have lost their value altogether at the end of the extra twenty
years.44 The eponymous petitioner in Golan wanted to use the works of
Shostakovich in order to introduce inner-city schoolchildren to classical
music; but he lacked the money to clear those rights, and so his plans
languished.45 I suppose it is too soon to say how the performers' rights
envisioned in the Beijing Treaty will play out against concerns like
these, but for the time being I will assume the best.
But these worries are small when considered against the
possibilities that we now face after Golan. Imagine a surge in the
direction of "copyright restoration" for works long thought to be free
from copyright protection. This is the latest threat to the public domain,
and it is far more serious than any that has gone before. It has followed
in no small part from our preoccupation with global commerce and
harmonization; from our commitment to ill-judged and unnecessary
legislation, urged on mainly by the copyright industries; and with the
support in turn of a Court that gives no evidence of understanding the
issues in terms that take us much beyond the realms of commerce, and
Congressional discretion unfettered by anything but politics at large.
When it comes to wholesale withdrawals of works from the
public domain, I cannot think we would have envisioned anything quite
as obviously destructive to freedom of expression at the outset of the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986.
I think it would still have seemed unlikely in 1989, when the United
States adhered to the Berne Convention. I am not sure it would have
been imaginable prior to the ratification of the TRIPS Accords in
Marrakech in 1994, when the WTO stepped into the picture. But at
some point along the way we lost our bearings. We no longer know who
we are-or rather, who we were. The implications for the future of
creativity and expression are in no sense reassuring.
But you will ask: where is the particular risk for the motion
picture industry in all of this? Let me respond to this entirely legitimate
challenge in two brief points.
First, in the initial stages of creative development and
pre-production for any given film, the industry depends upon access to
44. Consider the late John D. MacDonald's "Travis McGee" series, among others. See
LANGE & POWELL, supra note 4, at 94-95.
45. See Lange et al., supra note 5, at 88; see also Rich Bailey, Lawrence Golan Speaks
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the public domain. Sequels and remakes: each may look to the public
domain from time to time; but they are not at the center of the looming
problem for the industry. It is in such adaptations as Les Misgrables46
or Anna Karenina,47 for example, that we can see the dilemma most
clearly. Restore the underlying works in films like these to current
copyright protection, and you may well have removed one of the year's
leading Academy Award-nominated pictures from the realm of
existence altogether.
Imagine negotiating with the heirs of Victor Hugo for film rights
in Les Misdrables.48 Early negotiations leading toward Les Misgrables
might preclude the development of the film altogether; this would be a
loss to the public, and a disappointment to the would-be producers,
though still relatively inexpensive. But (taking the parameters of the
URAA as a model) it would approach the dimensions of a catastrophe
should restoration arise after the film has been completed and is in
release, especially prior to recoupment. Films do recoup, studio
accountants to the contrary notwithstanding; but it can take a while.
Cash flow cycles are long in the film business, and the fully allocated
profit margins are often thin, even when a single film succeeds on its
own. So the prospect of destructive intervening rights arising from
unanticipated restoration after release and distribution is not
far-fetched.
Does the Beijing Treaty threaten the film industry in similar
fashion? Not on the face of it; at least I do not think so. But once its
prospective benefits are firmly fixed in place, will we not need to
consider all those actors trapped in limbo in films fixed more than fifty
years ago? Should we not consider restoring rights to them as well?
How about Margaret O'Brien? Surely, she deserves restored
performance rights for her role as Tootie in Meet Me in Saint Louis in
1944. 4
9
I do not see how claims like hers can go unraised. I do not see
how they can go unanswered either, except as yet another exercise in
46. LES MISERABLES (Universal Pictures 2012).
47. ANNA KARENINA (Universal Pictures 2012).
48. That is not at all far-fetched. His heirs actually attempted to assert rights in France,
though they were rebuffed under French law. Kim Willsher, Heir of Victor Hugo Fails to
Stop Les Mis II, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/31/
books.france.
49. Remember her in the Halloween scene, just after she's thrown a bag of flour in the
face of old Mr. Geezer down the street? Her eyes widen at the unexpected acclaim of all the older
children gathered around the bonfire who dared her on, never believing for a moment that
Tootie-little Tootie!-would take up their challenge. In all of film's rich history, it stands as one
of childhood's supreme moments of self-recognition as she comes to terms with what this
accomplishment says about her personality and character: "I'm the most horrible!" MEET ME IN
ST. LOuIS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1944).
2013]
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
politics. This is where our investments in treaties and commerce have
brought us, guided along the way by a Supreme Court to which both
creativity and freedom of expression are little more than mere
abstractions. And do bear this in mind as well: the Beijing Treaty is
not just about money and credit; it is also about an understanding of
moral rights that confers upon every performer the power to limit
modifications in their performances that "are objectively prejudicial to
the performer's reputation in a substantial way."50 I don't know exactly
what that means; but if it adds anything at all, then it adds rights that
are not there now. Additional rights for some result in a loss of rights
for others.
Ah, well. Perhaps I take too dark a view of what we are gathered
here to celebrate. Perhaps the Beijing Treaty will prove to be a victory
for actors and studios alike. I hope very much that it will. If it does it
will be the answer to a long-held dream.
That is a pretty thought. As those of us who love movies and the
film business know, a dream is a wish your heart makes.5 1 And yet that
brings to mind another fable, with which I will conclude my remarks at
last. I expect you will all remember it. It is a story in which a wise
Mother Bear says to her son, who has been pursuing his own dreams, a
bit incautiously: "Be careful what you wish for, Little Bear. For you
may get it."
50. Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5 n.5.
51. A Dream Is a Wish Your Heart Makes, on WALT DISNEY'S CINDERELLA - ORIGINAL
SOUNDTRACK (Walt Disney Records 2005).
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